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Chapter 3
Integration as an Essentially Contested 
Concept: Questioning the Assumptions 




Integration is a term that can fittingly be included in what W. B. Gallie (1956, 
p. 169) labelled ‘essentially contested concepts’ – those notions ‘the proper use of 
which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of 
their users’. Gallie warned that the indetermination suffered by this kind of con-
cept cannot be settled by appeal to linguistics or logic, since it is caused by a dis-
pute, a substantive disagreement on the reasons for attributing any given meaning 
to the concept. As argued in the introduction to this volume, integration has become 
a key term in the social sciences and yet it can be used – as it is – for a variety of 
meanings.
The indetermination of the notion of integration is closely related to what the 
aims or the target of integration are considered to be: whether the underlying ‘prob-
lem’ that integration is to tackle is seen in terms of cultural distance from the major-
ity or as socio-economic disadvantage and whether the belief is either that the 
minority should integrate into the majority or that society as a whole should undergo 
an integration process as a response to increased diversity.
This chapter is concerned with the underlying assumptions that underpin the 
concept of integration aimed at a specific minority, the Roma, in two Mediterranean 
Western European countries, Italy and Spain. In both countries Roma minorities 
have been present in the territory for over five centuries.1 Yet, over the past two 
decades, Italy and Spain have also become destination countries for Roma individu-
als or families fleeing poverty and discrimination in their home countries.
1 For an overview of the historical context in Italy see Sigona 2005; Armillei 2014; Picker and 
Roccheggiani 2014; for Spain see Charnon-Deutsch 2004; Sánchez 2017.
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While Italy and Spain have fairly similar political and administrative structures 
and migration histories, and have both been heavily affected by the 2008 economic 
crisis, they differ radically in their treatment of Roma. While Spain is usually pre-
sented as a model of successful integration,2 Italy has been condemned repeatedly 
by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and other inter-
national bodies for its treatment of Roma.
In order to understand such different approaches, I here carry out a discourse 
and thematic analysis of the Roma-targeted integration legislation that exists in 
Italy and Spain. The National Roma Integration Strategies (henceforth NRIS), 
which both countries adopted in 2012  in compliance with the ‘European Roma 
Integration Framework’ promoted by Brussels, represent the cornerstones of the 
Roma integration policies in each country in terms of goal-setting and objectives to 
be achieved, and thus are critical to our understanding of how integration is inter-
preted. I combine the analysis of these policy documents with interviews with a 
range of actors involved, who are part of the politics of (dis)integration. This means 
attempting to uncover processes of negotiation and political dynamics around inte-
gration and disintegration. By giving policy-makers a voice on what Roma integra-
tion is about, according to them, and what they meant by it when drafting policies, 
we gain some insight into what the expectations of such measures and the politics 
behind them are.
This chapter is part of a broader study which builds on the hypothesis that the 
Spanish state historically focused mainly on the socio-economic dimension of the 
integration of the Roma, while Italy has adopted a more culturalist approach 
towards this specific minority. Analysis of the NRIS confirms the different levels 
of importance granted in each of the two countries to the cultural and economic 
aspects of integration. Yet, what emerges is also a picture in which the declared 
intent of promoting integration coexists with – and is part and parcel of – wider 
processes of disintegration. As explained in this volume’s introduction, disintegra-
tion processes and measures are hereby understood as policies that actively ‘do 
harm  [...], although they are sometimes  justified within a broader integration 
framework’ (Collyer et al. 2020, p. 2), and experiences of disintegration are not a 
problem experienced by a few individuals but a phenomenon of mainstream soci-
ety and its institutions.
In the case of Roma minorities and of racialised migrants more broadly, the dis-
courses have shifted over the past decade from protection against discrimination to 
the issue of ‘integration’ (Ciulinaru 2018). More specifically, ‘being integrated’ in 
the case of Roma minorities in Italy and Spain seems to be associated with ‘being a 
national’ which, in turn, is perceived as belonging to the mainstream, understood as 
the white middle-class sector of society (Magazzini 2018). In this sense, it appears 
that normative assumptions of integration have not radically changed in contempo-
rary Western Europe from that described as ‘segmented assimilation’ in the United 
States in the early 1990s (Portes and Zhou 2016). ‘Segmented assimilation’ chal-
2 For a problematisation of Spain’s ‘successful Roma integration’ see Magazzini and Piemontese 
2016; Vrăbiescu 2016; Vrăbiescu and Kalir 2017.
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lenged the idea that assimilation goes hand-in-hand with upward mobility, 
 recognising that immigrants and their descendents might experience ‘downward’ 
assimilation and/or selective acculturation. While the vocabulary employed in pol-
icy discourses aimed at minorities in contemporary Europe celebrates diversity and 
rejects assimilation, the assumptions behind the new concept of ‘integration’ are 
still rooted in an assimilationist idea of what it means to belong to a given commu-
nity. Disintegration practices are thus the result of an understanding of ‘integration’ 
that either requires assimilation – Spain compels Roma to be ‘proper Spaniards’ in 
order to be the recipients of inclusion policies – or pits the majority and minority as 
so inherently culturally different as to require physical separation or mediation – 
Italy compels Roma to be ‘ethnic others’ or ‘cultural others’ for them to benefit 
from integration policies.
3.2  (Roma) Integration as a Stratified Process
While, in European literature and policies, the concept of minority integration is 
usually understood to address the situation of migrants – and specifically of third- 
country nationals (Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx 2016; Murphy 2010; Penninx 
et al. 2008) – it has also become an increasingly pivotal term in directives and poli-
cies explicitly targeting Roma groups and individuals, even though the vast majority 
of them are European citizens and only relatively few have left their country of 
origin (Matras and Leggio 2018).
Roma minorities are specifically addressed in Italy’s and Spain’s reports pursu-
ant to Article 25, paragraph 2 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, a framework that, as a general rule, does not include ‘new’ 
minorities (even though it is not forbidden to do so).3 This would lead them to be 
thought of as ‘old’ or national minorities; however, at the same time, a specific set 
of ‘integration’ policies aimed at the Roma has emerged, which is an atypical way 
of conducting diversity management of, or accommodating, traditional minorities.4 
The rationale for the distinction between migrants and national minorities is fairly 
straightforward: since historical, autochthonous minorities became numerical 
3 ‘New’ minorities refer to migrants. For a distinction between ‘new’ (migrant) and ‘old’ (national) 
minorities, see Tina Magazzini 2018; Medda-Windischer 2014.
4 Long-established minorities in European countries, whether officially recognised or not as 
national minorities by the state in which they reside, have generally, albeit to different degrees, 
been granted some sort of autonomy from the state, and such autonomy (linguistic, fiscal, etc.) has 
typically not included interaction with mainstream society as a necessary feature of majority–
minority relations. While important historical, political and legal differences exist between Western 
and Eastern European countries, the protection of national minorities is not generally framed in 
terms of ‘integration’. The only exception I am aware of is the case of the ‘integration programmes’ 
developed by Estonia and Latvia for their Russian minorities but, even in these cases, an attempt 
was made to frame the policies as addressed to ‘residents with immigrant background’ or ‘immi-
grant settlers’ (Cianetti 2015, p. 201).
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minorities in the territories they have traditionally inhabited as a result of conquest, 
colonisation, state-building and/or the redrawing of international borders, their 
incorporation into the state is seen as ‘involuntary’ which, in turn, makes it difficult 
for the state to ask for concessions in terms of cultural integration5 (Medda- 
Windischer 2014, p. 3). The rights and protections afforded to refugees rest on simi-
lar assumptions of their migration being caused by external reasons of force majeure 
and thus being ‘involuntary’.
Conversely, minority integration in the European academic literature is com-
monly conceived of as a process shaped by the interaction between so-called ‘eco-
nomic migrants’ and the receiving society, even though it is ‘an interaction between 
parties that are fundamentally unequal in power and resources’ (Ponzo et al. 2013, 
p.  2), and, more recently, has been presented as a three-way process that also 
includes countries of origin (Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx 2016). However, as is 
noted in the chapter by Nimführ et al. (2020), the burden of integration, in most 
cases, tends to fall on the migrants, refugees or minorities, rather than on the state – 
even if this latter might subscribe to the principles of integration as a desirable goal 
for society as a whole.
‘Integration’ as a category of analysis may well fit the definition contained in the 
Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies as a ‘two-way process of 
mutual accommodation by minorities and residents of Member States’ (OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities 2012), yet the actual policies and practices 
related to it differ greatly. Indeed, to use the concept of ‘integration’ is to enter a 
minefield which can cause great political and theoretical concern, confusion and, in 
some cases, hostility, because of the diversity of meanings which the term can have. 
Lorenzo Cachón and Ben Gidley, amongst others, have pointed at how conceptual-
ising integration means making choices regarding the kind of ‘issue’ to be addressed 
(Cachón 2008; Gidley 2014). This can take radically different turns depending on 
whether we interpret it as an individual or a collective ‘integration’, as an issue 
involving a study of the actors or rather an analysis of the structures, as a process, a 
‘measurable’ result reflected upon general society or as a result/outcome measur-
able only with reference to the minority community, and whether ‘integration’ 
should study the behaviour (and/or processes) at an empirical level (including ana-
lysing policies) or instead delve into the normative regulatory field of how integra-
tion ‘should be’ and ‘should take place’ (Cachón 2008; Gidley 2013, 2014). These 
choices open up important questions related to the various dimensions of rights 
(civic and political, social, economic and cultural) as well as the interplay and rela-
tions between them, and issues such as whether there is a trade-off between differ-
ent types of integration (i.e. cultural versus socio-economic).
Thus – given all these variables and potential for misunderstandings – the first 
temptation is to criticise the concept of ‘integration’ and jettison it, as a number of 
authors have proposed (Merry 2014; Schinkel 2017). It is, however, a term that is 
increasingly difficult to avoid as it has entered the jargon of international politics 
5 The idea that migrants should integrate into the host society because of their migration being 
‘voluntary’ is debated, particularly in the case of refugees (see Lundberg 2016; Spencer 2004).
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and of EU policy to such an extent that to do away with it would mean to give up on 
analysing altogether the causes and consequences of one of the most compelling 
current debates, both in terms of minority rights and of diversity management. In 
the case of Roma-targeted policies, ‘integration’ has turned into the officially 
declared goal of the EU as a whole as well as of individual countries, becoming an 
inescapable component of Roma politics itself. The departing point of this chapter 
is that integration, as stated in this volume’s introduction, encompasses a set of 
normative assumptions, practices, policies and discourses that are always embedded 
in specific context.
3.3  Roma Integration Regimes: European Narratives 
and Fragmented Collectivities
Against this background, how can and should we situate the ‘Roma integration’ 
concept and policy framework? The emergence of the Roma minority as a category 
to be ‘integrated’ saw a significant hoist in the late 1990s and early 2000s, along 
with a more general preoccupation with minority protection in Europe, following 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of Yugoslavia and the wars that accom-
panied it. The 1993 Copenhagen criteria required member-states to demonstrate 
‘respect for and protection of minorities’. Such a principle led to the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which came into effect in 
1998 and which, beyond fighting discrimination, is concerned with the preservation 
and development of the culture and identity of national minorities. This, in turn, 
translates into certain legal guarantees dealing with minorities’ access to media, 
education and basic services accessible in their language. The Roma were included 
by some countries as a ‘national minority’ that falls within the scope of the conven-
tion and that is therefore in need of ‘protection’, but such a narrative has run counter 
to a parallel discourse on Roma ‘integration’. This narrative has gained traction in 
recent years and tends to frame the Roma as a minority that is disadvantaged vis-à- 
vis the majority but that is more in need of ‘getting up to speed’ with the rest of 
society than of ‘protection’ as an indigenous cultural minority – or even of protec-
tion from discrimination. As Ciulinaru argues in reference to Eastern European 
Roma who migrated to France and have faced repatriation:
[P]rejudice against the Roma took over the debate about their discrimination as migrants 
[…]. Of particular importance is the shift in discourse from protection against discrimina-
tion to integration, and the implications this shift had on diminishing the responsibility of 
national and EU authorities for protection of migrants from discrimination (2018, pp. 2–3).
A 2003 meeting of 12 European countries to promote the socio-economic inclu-
sion of Roma minorities in the region resulted in the launch of the Decade for 
Roma Inclusion initiative (2005–2015), ‘an unprecedented political commitment 
by European governments to eliminate discrimination against Roma and close the 
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unacceptable gaps between Roma and the rest of society’ (Brüggemann and 
Friedman 2017). While the elimination of discrimination is mentioned, the real 
focus of the Decade, as can be seen by its funding allocation and programmes, is 
rooted in the idea of ‘uplifting’ a vulnerable population from extreme poverty and 
marginalisation. The ‘acknowledging’ or ‘constructing’ of the Roma as a vulner-
able category – a group considered to be especially susceptible to social exclusion 
(European Commission 2010) – and the representation of Roma exclusion as a 
public problem differed, however, from the accounts of other disadvantaged or 
marginalised groups. While the European Commission never singled out Roma 
exclusion in documents on welfare, economic growth and social inclusion, it 
developed a parallel set of reports, directives and recommendations addressing the 
Roma as a specifically disadvantaged group. Similarly, other international organ-
isations, researchers and often also Roma activists have tended to reinforce the 
idea that the Roma face a set of obstacles that are completely different from the 
issues faced by other minority groups or by the majority population, which sets 
them in a category of their own. Thus, the growing debate around Roma marginali-
sation –and the need for Roma integration– has made for the hybridisation of a 
discourse that is highly ethnicised and yet, at the same time, centred on poverty 
and exclusion.
This has led to a Roma Integration Strategy Framework which sets the same 
markers and means as those typically used to assess the integration of migrants and 
refugees, but without addressing what Ager and Strang identified as the foundation 
of integration, namely the issue of rights and citizenship.
In their 2008 paper ‘Understanding integration: a conceptual framework’, Ager 
and Strang carried out a thorough review of the ways in which the term integration 
had been used in policy documents in an attempt to identify those elements that 
were consistently central to perceptions of what constituted integration (Ager and 
Strang 2008). In their article, the target population to be ‘integrated’ were refugees 
and, by analysing the 200 indicators of integration proposed by the 1997 Council of 
Europe’s Report Measurements and Indicators of Integration and combining an 
additional literature review with fieldwork in refugee camps, they came up with the 
recurrent dimensions of integration, illustrated in Fig. 3.1.
In the following sections I take a similar approach, looking at how ‘Roma inte-
gration’ is defined in the Italian and Spanish NRIS, which lay the conceptual frame-
work for the actions that governments are expected to pursue with regard to Roma 
minorities. While not focusing on all of Ager and Strang’s domains, I look at the 
understanding of ‘integration’ of policy-makers and how they translated such under-
standings into a conceptual framework for the national strategies. This shows how 
integration is not a set ‘package’ of measurable characteristics but, rather, a strati-




3.4  The ‘Subjectivisation’ of Roma Integration: Political 
Contexts and Actors
This section provides the context and content of integration strategies aimed at the 
Roma in Italy and Spain. I firstly outline the political background of the NRIS, then 
look at the different definitions of the target population and analyse the use of ‘inte-
gration’ within the documents that is made in relation to this target population.
The rationale for introducing explicitly targeted measures to reduce inequality 
for the Roma was rooted in the conviction that Roma integration would both foster 
social cohesion and bring economic benefits to society as a whole (Vermeersch 
2012). As explained in the introduction, this is also one of the core arguments that 
this book makes and which encompasses the (dis)integration processes faced by 
refugees, migrant and non-migrant minorities alike: the disintegration of some 
(including barriers to their access to resources and institutions) is inherently con-
nected to the disintegration of society as a whole (Collyer et al. 2020; Hinger 2020; 
Lundberg et al. 2016).
The concern of Western European countries to deter large numbers of Eastern 
European Roma from migrating westward – what Liz Fekete (2014) defined as an 
attempt to curb a ‘free movement of poverty’ – also played an important role in 
promoting Roma-specific policies. Particularly following Italy’s and France’s repa-






















Fig. 3.1 A conceptual framework defining core domains of integration
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and Bulgaria would translate into significant numbers of impoverished Roma 
migrating to Western Europe functioned as a catalyser for action.6
In 2012, both Italy and Spain submitted an NRIS to the European Commission, 
as requested by the EU. While there was no officially agreed-upon definition of 
integration, the European Commission (2011) communication An EU Framework 
for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020 identified the issue in the fol-
lowing manner:
Since non-discrimination alone is not sufficient to combat the social exclusion of Roma, the 
Commission asks the EU institutions to endorse this EU Framework for National Roma 
Integration Strategies. It is a means to complement and reinforce the EU’s equality legisla-
tion and policies by addressing, at national, regional and local level, but also through dia-
logue with and participation of the Roma, the specific needs of Roma regarding equal 
access to employment, education, housing and healthcare.
The two countries therefore found themselves with two comparatively similar docu-
ments which were, however, the result of very different processes: Spain in 
2011–2012 already had a fairly long trajectory of Roma inclusion plans and prac-
tices to draw upon for the drafting of its NRIS. In fact, the European Framework for 
Roma Integration put forward by the European Commission borrowed a number of 
features  – i.e. the focus on four priority areas (education, health, housing and 
employment) – from the structure and goals set by the Decade for Roma Inclusion, 
of which Spain was a strong driver, and from Spain’s ‘explicit but not exclusive’ 
approach. It is therefore not surprising that the 2011 EU Framework was well 
received by the Spanish government and that Spain did not encounter major difficul-
ties in producing a national strategy in line with European guidelines. In terms of 
institutional responsibility for the development and implementation of Roma inte-
gration guidelines, the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality was charged 
with producing the strategy and it remains the National Contact Point to manage 
and implement it.7
Italy, instead, selected the Italian Office against Racial Discrimination (UNAR) 
as the National Contact Point for the strategy. The UNAR, established at the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers within the Department for Equal 
Opportunities, was instituted by Decree no. 215 of 9 July 2003, which transposed 
into Italian law the European Directive 43/2000. It has, however, seen a series of 
setbacks, scandals and changes in its directorate and staff composition since its 
inception, mainly because of it being very much dependent upon the ruling govern-
ment. When asked about the structure and responsibilities of UNAR, one senior 
Italian policy advisor stated:
6 Between 2008 and 2010, under the justification of a ‘nomad emergency’ promoted by the 
Berlusconi government, five Italian provinces fingerprinted, evicted and relocated to encampments 
many Roma families who had been living in so-called ‘unauthorised camps’. Around the same 
time, Sarkozy’s government in France evicted hundreds of Romanian and Bulgarian Roma and 
provided economic incentives to those who agreed to leave the country (Kóczé 2017.).
7 For a contextualization of the Gitano-Roma nuance in Spain see Magazzini and Piemontese 2016.
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UNAR is not independent, it doesn’t have its own budget nor political autonomy; it is com-
pletely dependent upon the Prime Minister, who can appoint and revoke the staff; and it is 
attached to the Department for Equal Opportunities, which isn’t even a Ministry…in short, 
it is not worth a hill of beans (Interview 12).
Another interviewee commented that ‘[t]he UNAR staff basically lives off the 
National Roma Integration Strategy. Without it they would have no purpose, even 
though they couldn’t care less about the integration of the Roma’ (email follow up 
to an interview with a senior consultant, Ufficio Rom, Sinti e Caminanti).
The way in which the term ‘integration’ is used in both national strategies is 
noteworthy, and appears to be more of an adaptation of EU vocabulary than a term 
of choice for the two governments. In Spain, the ‘Estrategia Nacional para la 
Inclusión Social de la Población Gitana en España 2012–2020’ uses the term 
‘social inclusion’ rather than ‘integration’ in its Spanish version (Ministerio de 
Sanidad Servicios Sociales e Igualdad de España 2012, emphasis added). This is 
also reflected in the body of the text: the word ‘inclusion’ is used over 50 times, 
while ‘integration’ features fewer than 15. Both terms are employed not as a ‘two- 
way process’, but rather as a de facto synonym for a poor section of society that 
needs to overcome socio-economic marginalisation. When describing the chal-
lenges that the strategy aims to tackle, the document reads:
In general terms, Roma people in Spain have seen significant social progress in the last 40 
years; such progress is the result of the arrival of democracy in Spanish society, economic 
growth on a national scale, the establishment of a Social state, generalized access to social 
welfare systems (particularly housing, education, healthcare and social services and bene-
fits) and specific measures and programmes aimed at correcting disadvantages. However, 
there is still a long way to go for there to be equality in the four fundamental areas for social 
inclusion, and on which the targets of this National Roma Integration Strategy for Spain are 
based (Ibid., 2012, p. 5).
A NRIS section entitled The 2020 National Roma Integration Strategy: Definition 
and Targets provides a detailed description of the targets aimed at improving the 
living conditions of Roma in Spain and includes mid-term quantifiable targets to be 
reached by 2015 and 2020 for each of the key areas of social inclusion: education, 
health, employment and housing. However, it does not offer an explicit definition of 
what ‘integration’ or ‘inclusion’ mean.
An adviser to the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality (MSSSI) 
who contributed to the Spanish strategy’s conceptual framework, offered the fol-
lowing explanation when asked to define the term ‘integration’ for the purposes of 
the NRIS:
Well, the semantics of a term always carry nuances and are important. It’s not the same to 
say ‘handicapped’ or ‘disabled’ or ‘person with a disability’. The terminology has been 
changing and evolving with Roma as well … but basically the NRIS uses the term [integra-
tion] that was established by the European Framework. The term was really just adopted 
because of that. However, when [later in the document] the meaning that is given to [inte-
gration] is explained, you can see that the principles for Roma integration are defined, and 
basically what is meant by integration is the improvement of the living conditions of the 
Roma population, their normalisation into society, while respecting their differences and 
their particularities. And for this reason, the Spanish strategy should not be reduced to the 
3 Integration as an Essentially Contested Concept: Questioning the Assumptions…
50
four axes established by the European framework (education, housing, etc.) but we also 
included aspects related to culture, discrimination, etc – aspects that we have always worked 
on and that we considered important (Interview 7).
It is true that the concept of Roma identity and culture is neither dismissed nor 
totally excluded from the Spanish strategy,8 but it is certainly not the main pillar of 
what Roma integration is understood to require or entail. In talking about the trade- 
offs between an identity-based approach and a socio-economic one, the same inter-
viewee summarised his position, and the way he framed the NRIS, in this way:
For years there has been, in Spain and also in Europe, something that I would call ‘a nega-
tive empowerment’ or a ‘misunderstood empowerment’9 of Roma with a focus in some 
cases towards defending and using more ‘ethnic arguments’ for Roma integration. I don’t 
share this view: I don’t think that it’s the right approach. I am more in favour of an intercul-
tural approach, for many reasons, which doesn’t mean that I am against Roma identity … 
on the contrary, I am completely in favour of the empowerment of Roma – that is to say, I 
believe that we must seek the leadership and participation of Roma. But when you have an 
ethnic approach – and I have seen this quite a bit in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe – the fundamental risk is that the Roma issue becomes a problem of the Roma, not 
a problem of society, and therefore specialised agencies are created, and the integration of 
Roma is of course delegated to these organisations. And that does not work, and nowhere 
has it been shown that this works because, in the end, the key to the integration of Roma lays 
fundamentally in the access to standardised, normalised services, in policies by the minis-
try, which then have to be balanced with targeted measures (Interview 7).
Similar considerations about this understanding of integration, consistent with the 
idea of it being a matter of improving Roma’s socio-economic conditions – often 
referred to in terms of ‘normalising’ or ‘bringing to the same level’ the rate of 
unemployment, education outcome etc. of Roma persons as that of the non-Roma 
population – were made by a number of other Spanish interviewees in charge of 
policy-making and/or implementation (Interviews 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9). While none 
of the policy-makers interviewed denied nor wanted to antagonise Roma identity 
and culture, these aspects are seen as residing outside the integration paradigm 
which is, instead, understood to be a matter of access to services.
Italy presents some common features from a superficial terminological outset but 
a very different – and almost specular – focus with respect to the content and mean-
ing of integration. In Italy’s NRIS, which is approximately twice the Spanish one in 
length, the word ‘integration’ is also not featured in the title, which is ‘National 
Strategy for the Inclusion of Roma, Sinti and Caminanti Communities’.10 Footnote 
1 of the text specifies that
In view of the differing legal status of the members of relevant groups (please see below 
para.1.5), it would better respond to the current heterogeneous Italian situation, the follow-
ing title: ‘Strategy for the Inclusion/Integration of Roma, Sinti and Caminanti communi-
ties’ (National Office on Anti-Racial Discriminations National Focus Point 2012, p. 3).
8 The document mentions the creation, in 2007, of the Institute for Roma Culture, and contains the 
creation of educational materials on Roma culture and history to be included in schools.
9 ‘Un mal empoderamiento o un empoderamiento mal entendido’.
10 ‘Strategia Nazionale per l’Inclusione dei Rom, Sinti e Caminanti’ in Italian.
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The terms ‘inclusion’ and ‘integration’, in the Italian National Strategy, are linked 
to the principles of anti-discrimination and equality, but the usage of rights and 
equality is in turn very much tied to the differentiation between citizens and non- 
citizens. As Nina Sahraoui’s chapter in this volume illustrates, if integration is a tool 
for establishing ‘equality of both access and outcome for migrants and racialised 
minorities’ (Sahraoui, 2020), the legal dimension of anti-discrimination policies 
alone clearly falls short of addressing the structural power dynamics that allow and 
reproduce racist behaviours. Not only does it fall short of ensuring equality, but it 
also can be used as window-dressing for state naturalisation of inequalities within 
society. Disintegration, for Roma residing in Italy is, therefore, at least in part, the 
result of the government having successfully constructed the illusion of neutrality 
by merely granting individuals the same rights and opportunities, without concern-
ing itself with the outcome: ‘[t]he assumption that we live in post-racial societies de 
facto obscures the continuity of ‘race’ as an organising dynamic in European societ-
ies’ (Sahraoui, 2020, p. 84). In the Italian NRIS, there is a general preoccupation 
with defining the excluded groups as either ‘regular’ or ‘irregular’. Such legalistic 
differentiations are, however, difficult to implement in terms of concrete policy 
actions. As the UNAR senior legal adviser who drafted the NRIS’ conceptual frame-
work argued, when explaining the way in which ‘integration’ is employed in the 
Italian strategy:
From a juridical point of view, we should keep the concept of integration and inclusion 
separated, because integration applies to those who, for instance, are not European citizens, 
while inclusion is for those who are European citizens but are not Italian. This is a distinc-
tion that I made in the strategy. Honestly it is, however, a bit useless to make these distinc-
tions between integration and inclusion. I prefer to speak of outright inclusion because if, 
let’s say, you are a European citizen, it is now useless to make these distinctions between 
European and Italian citizens, we are all Europeans now … so I think we should enter the 
order of ideas that the concept of integration must be overcome, even if it is true that part of 
the Roma who are in Italy are from places such as Bosnia, Albania, Montenegro, so they are 
not yet in the European Union. I did specify in the first footnote of the strategy that the 
concept of integration is different from that of inclusion.... But I tell you, really, it’s quite 
useless to make that distinction, because we should really just speak of inclusion and that’s 
it (Interview 10).
Despite the interviewee’s choice of terminology, there is no objective legal basis to 
claim that ‘integration’ should refer to Third Country Nationals while ‘inclusion’ 
has to do with European citizens. Yet, making such a differentiation in the NRIS 
contributes to frame differently the targets of the strategy based on their citizen-
ship status.
As shown in Sophie Hinger’s chapter in this volume, ‘[s]tate actors and the pol-
icy documents they produce are of special relevance, because of their power posi-
tion and because their formal systems of categorisation are particularly apt for 
deconstruction’ (Martiniello & Simon 2005 cit. in Hinger 2020, p. 21). If Germany 
places special emphasis, in the case of asylum-seekers, on the legal status of those 
eligible as recipients of integration strategies, Italy operates similarly with regard to 
Roma individuals. As has been observed with respect to refugees and migrants, 
integration policies are mainly marked by a national framing of integration 
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(Hinger, 2020). It is noteworthy that, while it is more evident in the case of Italy, the 
‘national’ dimension of integration is just as strong in Spain’s approach.
In fact, an interesting element that emerges from both strategies is that the (dis)
integration processes are deeply linked to what constitutes the idea of being a 
‘national’. Those who are perceived as ‘in need of integration’ are either portraid as 
foreigners (Italy) or as second-class citizens (Spain) (Magazzini 2018).
3.5  Whose Integration?
While in Spain the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality seems to have 
incorporated in the NRIS some cultural elements advanced by the Segretariado 
Gitano, the Unión Romaní, the Fundación Instituto de Cultura Gitana and other 
entities, the focus and benchmarking remain strongly centred around the economic 
aspect of integration and, particularly, the employment and schooling dimensions. 
The Director of the Roma Social Programme Unit at MSSSI described the ‘Spanish 
model’ of Roma integration and its line of action thus:
The key to the Spanish model has been a programmatic approach that has prioritised mea-
sures to redress inequalities and improve living conditions over other approaches more 
focused on issues of identity, advocacy for minorities or political participation which, in 
fact, have also started to emerge but later. … we privileged a socio-economic approach over 
the ethnic approach (Interview 1).
This does not mean that there is unanimity amongst the different stakeholders on the 
success of such an approach or that its implementation has been consistent or uni-
form in different autonomous communities (Bereményi and Mirga 2012). However, 
there was general agreement among Spanish policy-makers in understanding the 
concept of integration as ‘raising the living standards of the Roma population’, as 
members of the Spanish population. The rejection of a cultural lens can be seen in 
the conflation of the ‘cultural’ with the ‘ethnic’, two terms that most interviewees 
used interchangeably. If the stress is on bettering the living conditions of part of a 
population, it is only natural that policies will omit any reference to the ‘ethnic or 
cultural other’, even though this has often meant, in practice, that Roma immigrants 
end up being excluded from such integration policies (Magazzini and 
Piemontese 2016).
Conversely, while, in Spain, it was considered necessary to not single out the 
Roma as recipients of specific policies in order to prevent the promotion of ‘differ-
ence’ over ‘equality’ (Kostka 2015, p. 82), the Italian strategy focuses, instead, pre-
cisely on differential treatment for different categories:
When considering the human rights-based approach, it should be always very clear who are 
the recipients of relevant measures, the rights-holders and the duty-bearers. […] With this 
strategy Italy intends to achieve the effective integration/social inclusion of Roma, Sinti and 
Caminanti communities, besides effectively enabling them to fully exercise fundamental 
rights, as enshrined in Art. 2 of the Italian Constitution. […] It has been stressed, under Part 
One of the present strategy, the differing legal statuses of members of the minority under 
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reference, to whom to apply the fundamental principles of the Italian Constitution, primar-
ily Art. 3, being dedicated to the principle of equality and non-discrimination. […] On a 
practical note, such principle [the equality principle] envisages that: it shall be treated on a 
equal basis what is equal; and on a different basis, what is different (National Office on 
Anti-Racial Discriminations National Focus Point 2012, pp. 19–20).
This passage is interesting because it makes explicit that one of the main concerns 
of the Italian strategy is to identify and categorise the various Roma groups based 
on their legal status, and that those categories should function as a criterion for 
which rights and duties belong to each category. This is also reflected in Paragraph 
1.5 of Italy’s NRIS, which does not explicitly define either inclusion or integration 
but does provide an extensive overview of demographic estimates broken down by 
citizenship status. The data provided, however, are inconsistent: on Page 12, the 
estimate given for the totality of the Roma residing in Italy is about 140,000 (around 
0.23 per cent of the total population – the approximate calculation provided by the 
Council of Europe), ‘most of whom are children and youngsters based in Italy, with 
Italian nationality’. This is, however, immediately contradicted by a paragraph in 
which the estimates add up to over 160,000 persons, most of whom do not hold 
Italian citizenship:
They can be divided into three main groups in relation to the citizenship and period of 
immigration: The first group consists of approximately 70,000 people (Italian citizens) 
whose first records date back to the fourteenth century and are distributed throughout the 
country.; The second group consists of about 90,000 Roma people from the Balkan region 
(non-EU citizens) who arrived in Italy, in the 90s, especially after the disintegration of the 
former Yugoslavia. This group is mainly settled in Northern Italy. The third – more recent – 
group … is made up of Roma people with Romanian and Bulgarian nationality (EU citi-
zens), who mainly live in large cities (Milan, Turin, Rome, Naples, Bologna, Bari, Genoa) 
(National Office on Anti-Racial Discriminations National Focus Point 2012, p. 12).
It is noteworthy that, even for the first group – Italian citizens – the ‘foreign’ ances-
try dating back to the fourteenth century is stressed. Mention is also made a page 
later in the strategy to
[t]hose irregular Roma people, whose exact number has not been set yet, officially. For 
example, the Prefecture of Rome detected the presence, on the local territory, of 
12,000/13,000 irregular Roma people, compared with 7,000 regular Roma people living in 
around 20 unauthorized camps (National Office on Anti-Racial Discriminations National 
Focus Point 2012, p. 13, emphasis added).
The last sentence is particularly telling of how, despite the claim that the NRIS rep-
resented a radical rupture with the previous paradigm in Italy, Roma are still very 
much tied, in the government’s view, to either the so-called ‘authorised camps’11 or 
the ‘unauthorised camps’.12 As articulated in Hinger’s chapter in this volume and by 
Mihai Surdu in his 2016 book Those Who Count: Expert Practices of Roma 
Classification (Surdu 2016), the power and danger of categories and categorisations 
11 In practice, segregated ghettos run by local administrations that sub-contract their ‘manage-
ment’ – mainly surveillance – to private agencies or NGOs.
12 Slums/shantytowns, generally built on publicly owned land on the outskirts of cities.
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to integration policies lies in the fact that, even though they are social constructions, 
they are framed as natural and mutually exclusive, while people may move between 
and fit into several categories. ‘The supposed exhaustiveness of category systems 
can be deconstructed if we look beyond those groups or individuals highlighted by 
the policy and ask who is obscured or only targeted implicitly by a policy and why’ 
(Hinger 2020).
On the whole, it seems that the approach adopted by the Italian government in its 
2012 strategy is indeed an attempt to comply with European demands, but that the 
Roma minority is still seen (not only sociologically but also institutionally) as cul-
tural and ethnic ‘others’. While the Spanish approach conceives Roma exclusion as 
a product of wider socio-economic changes, the Italian one points directly at Roma 
groups with alleged particular problems and regards the issue as cultural and behav-
ioural, thus focusing on group identity and characteristics rather than on discrimina-
tory patterns or institutional incapacity to address a systemic lack of affordable 
housing.13
The strategies are, by and large, a reflection of how the majority of policy-makers 
understand the Roma’s role in society and the role they can ‘fill’ in either economic 
or political terms. Based on policy-makers’ way of speaking about the beneficiaries 
of Roma policies, we notice that Spain focuses on the socio-economic dimension of 
integration while Italy highlights cultural integration. Beyond this difference, an 
equally important distinction between the two approaches is that, while the Spanish 
narrative is about improving living conditions for part of its population (who might 
well be overly represented among the poor and less-educated, as well as culturally 
different and/or subject to ethnic discrimination), Italy’s discourse is about incorpo-
rating, integrating or accommodating an ‘external’ group (or rather multiple exter-
nal groups) who are not part of the Italian nation and its society, even though they 
might hold Italian citizenship. In Italy, the problem is framed as being about inte-
grating foreigners or citizens of foreign origin who, in any case, hold a culture and 
values that are seen as distant, and often opposed, to ‘Italianity’. Therefore, the 
indicators and framework adopted are those usually employed in the ‘migrant inte-
gration’ literature, including the need to respect ‘migrant’ identity and ‘diversity’ 
while making sure that they [the migrants/Roma] accept (unspecified) ‘Italian’ val-
ues. In Spain, it is instead about bringing ‘up to level’ an impoverished and ‘defi-
cient’ section of the population, therefore the indicators and categories used are 
those linked to social exclusion, employment and economic growth.14
13 For a more detailed account of Roma classifiers as targets of specific policies in Italy and Spain, 
see Magazzini (2018).
14 A sentence that is repeated more than once in the Spanish strategy, and in the numerous plans and 
actions, and that represents the main pillar of Spain’s approach towards Roma integration is ‘Roma 
are full and equal citizens in Spain’ (‘Los gitanos son ciudadanos de pleno derecho en España’). 




3.6  Concluding Remarks: (Dis)Integration Dynamics 
within Integration Policy Frameworks
This chapter has built upon an analysis of the Roma integration strategies adopted 
by Italy and Spain, and on interviews with the policy-makers in charge of these 
strategies, to explore how ‘integration’ is understood and acted upon by policy- 
makers in these two settings. By looking at the NRIS and their formulation in Italy 
and Spain, what emerges in terms of general trends is that the Spanish framework 
revolves mainly around socio-economic elements, while the Italian one prioritises 
the differentiation between different legal statuses and the alleged need for cultural 
mediation. There are, however, some commonalities in the ways in which Roma are 
seen as ‘deficient’, lagging behind the majority population (in either cultural or 
economic terms). The fact that national identity dominates both strategies –even 
more than the concept of integration itself– is highly consequential for their out-
come, and for the ways in which the recipients of integration policies are catego-
rised.15 On the whole, the fundamental difference – beyond the economic or cultural 
approach – seems to be whether or not Roma are framed as belonging to the national 
polity. It could actually be said that it is precisely whether Roma individuals are 
perceived as citizens of the respective country (regardless of their actual legal sta-
tus) that determines a socio-economic or a cultural approach.
Because group solidarity relies heavily on the contingency of perceptions of 
commonality and otherness, the dichotomy ‘in group’ vs ‘out group’ is crucial, 
particularly in times of economic crisis, in constructing categories of deservingness 
(Kymlicka 2015). Who belongs to ‘us’ and is therefore rightfully entitled to welfare 
benefits, social housing, health services and so on? Each case responds to distinct 
political necessities and societal contexts, and neither is accidental. While Spain 
decided to ‘use’ Roma policies as an effective tool to attract European funds and 
develop what has been called ‘a strategy of competitiveness with a human face’ 
(Kostka 2015, p. 82), Italy wrapped its plan in an eloquent human rights discourse 
which, however, has proven quite shallow (thus flexible) in terms of concrete mea-
sures. This can be problematised and declined in various ways, but the baseline 
narrative is that Roma ‘have problems’ (or are themselves a problem) and are thus 
in need of ‘integration’.
This distinction points at the necessity to delve, beyond integration’s markers 
and means, into its foundation, as defined by Ager and Strang: rights and full citi-
zenship. In their definition Ager and Strang (2008) acknowledge that such a founda-
tion is by no means consistent across different countries, nor does citizenship 
necessarily respond to fulfilling the same criteria everywhere:
15 While the words ‘integration’ and ‘inclusion’ are used cumulatively about 60 times in the Spanish 
strategy and 130 times in the Italian, the Spanish document used the terms ‘national’, ‘Spain’ or 
‘Spanish’ 188 times, and the Italian one the words ‘national’, ‘Italy’ or ‘Italian’ 483 times, inciting 
us to question who the Roma targeted by these integration policies are for policy-makers.
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Definitions of integration adopted by a nation inevitably depend on that nation’s sense of 
identity, its ‘cultural understandings of nation and nationhood’ (Saggar 1995, p. 106). This 
sense of identity as a nation incorporates certain values; and these are values that signifi-
cantly shape the way that a concept such as integration is approached’ (Ager and Strang 
2008, pp. 173–174).
They suggest that a discussion about citizenship and rights should be made explicit 
whenever applying the notion of integration in any given setting. How to do so is, 
however, less clear, precisely because ‘notions of nationhood, citizenship and rights 
will vary across settings’ (Ibid., p. 176). Of course, the political dimension of the 
exclusion and marginalisation is hardly, if ever, really separated from either cultural 
or economic inequalities or both. To the non-citizen who enjoys a sense of cultural 
belonging and recognition in the host country and who does not suffer from eco-
nomic hardship and the personal insecurity that comes with it, the idea of being a 
citizen is largely superfluous. It is when a group has access to neither cultural nor 
economic rights that the lack of civic and political rights comes at a high cost.
One way to overcome the exclusion and disintegration processes that racialised 
minorities are subjected to might be, as suggested by some of the chapters in this 
book (Desille 2020; Hinger 2020) to focus more on the local dimension of integra-
tion, which is where the practicality of integration measures holds the potential to 
override ethno-nationalist rhetoric. Yet the wider issue that this raises is that state 
institutions are themselves engaged in producing and reproducing not only integra-
tion but also disintegration, by selectively organising and categorising ‘deserving’ 
and ‘underserving’ individuals. What Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas have called 
‘probationary citizenship’ with respect to irregular migrants (2012, p. 243), applies 
similarly to racialized minorities such as the Roma. Integration measures are granted 
to (or forced upon) Roma groups based on their perceived ‘deservingness’ and/or 
ability to participate in the majoritarian society. To be ‘integrated’ becomes there-
fore to become ‘closer’ to an imaginary ideal national citizen.
Against this backdrop, an analysis of the Roma integration strategies in Spain 
and Italy shows us that, while widely different in scope and trajectories, they share 
two problematic assumptions with other European integration strategies aimed at 
migrants and refugees. One is an ethno-national framing of integration, which is 
rarely made explicit but permeates most integration policies, fostering the illusion 
of a homogenous ethno-national identity that ‘others’ should ntegrate into. The 
other assumption is the understanding of integration as a ‘privilege’ to be either 
‘earned’ by the outsiders through hard work or that might be ‘granted’ to them by 
the institutions upon proof of good conduct (Hinger 2020). As argued in the intro-
duction to this volume, the perceived desirability of the integration of specific indi-
viduals ultimately depends on how they are categorised by the state in which they 
live, with those who are seen as too ‘foreign’ or ‘deviant’ increasingly becoming the 
target of disintegration policies or practices which, in turn, harm society as a whole. 
As long as even explicit integration policies rest on these assumptions, however, 
they will continue to produce and reproduce disintegration dynamics at both the 
individual and collective levels.
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3.7  List of Interviews
Interview 1: Director of the Roma special programme unit, Ministry of Health, 
Social Services and Equality (MSSSI), Spain, 14 October 2014.
Interview 2: Local councillor (social services), City Council of Aviles, Spain, 16 
October 2014.
Interview 3: Member of the Board of Trustees, Fundacion Secretariado Gitano 
(FSG), Spain, 16 October 2014.
Interview 4: Member of the Welfare Committee, Parliament of Catalunya, 17 
October 2014.
Interview 5: Member of the Social Service Department, City Council of Zaragoza, 
17 October 2014.
Interview 6: Member of the Governing Board, Instituto de Realojamiento e 
Integracion Social (IRIS), Spain, 18 October 2014.
Interview 7: Legal adviser, Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality 
(MSSSI), Spain, 17 April 2015.
Interview 8: Head of the Promotion of Social Action Programme, City Council of 
Bilbao, 9 June 2016.
Interview 9: Member of the Governing Board, City Council of San Sebastian, 8 July 
2016.
Interview 10: Senior legal adviser, National Office Against Racial Discrimination 
(UNAR), Italy, 6 August 2015.
Interview 11: Senior consultant, Ufficio Rom, Sinti e Caminanti, Italy, 14 November 
2015.
Interview 12: Senior policy adviser, Roma Capitale, Italy, 19 December 2015.
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